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Introduction 
Over the past few years, a bourgeoning stream of research has demonstrated that learning from 
business failure can have positive effects on business performance and survival (Madsen & 
Desai, 2010; Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). Following Whetten (1980) that an examination of the 
determinants and effects of business failure is an imperative in seeking to reduce risk of business 
operation, business failure has become an area of growing interests to scholars in mainstream 
management (e.g. Madsen & Desai, 2010; Shepherd & Haynie, 2011; Singh et al., 2015). To 
date, some efforts have been made in examining the determinants of business failure (e.g. Carter 
& Auken, 2006), but these are somewhat too general.  
Recent empirical and theoretical works in the areas of strategic management, international 
business and organisational ecology have demonstrated a lack of clear consensus about the 
causes of business failure, polarising along the exogenous and endogenous views. The 
exogenous view suggests the causes of business failure should be attributed to exogenous factors 
such as market competition and recession (Freeman & Hannan, 1983; Henderson, 1999). The 
endogenous view, however, suggests that characteristics of managers and owners play a 
significant role in business failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). In recent years, however, it has 
been suggested that the causes of business failure entail both the exogenous and endogenous 
factors (Carter & Auken, 2006; Hambrick, 2007).  
Although some studies have suggested that any explanation of business failure is not complete 
without explicating the interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004, 2010), the micro-level mechanisms and processes leading to business failure remain 
largely unexplored. In spite of decades of research on business failure and the potentially 
positive effects of experiential learning from failure (Cope, 2011), the existing streams of 
research on the subject have concentrated on why firms fail, leaving the processes and stages 
leading to failure largely unexplored.  
 3 
 
In this study, we take a step forward in filling this theoretical and empirical gap in our 
understanding by examining the processes and mechanisms inherent in how business failure 
unfolds. Utilising insights of 50 failed entrepreneurs in China, we developed a process model to 
demonstrate changes and processes over time and reveal mechanisms underlying the interaction 
of exogenous and endogenous factors. The research context was in eastern China which has a 
low rate of business survival. From 2000 to 2012, 38.8% of registered companies experienced 
failure within the first five years from 2008 to 2012; 50.4% of the total registered firms failed 
within five to 10 years (State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC, 2013). 
This study makes two major contributions to strategy, business failure and entrepreneurship 
literature. Our first contribution is the development of a construct of dynamic capabilities 
malfunction (DCM) to explain how business processes and transitions can precipitate business 
failure. This study conceptualises the malfunction of capabilities as processes leading to business 
failure. It is contended that business failure can occur in a process of transition or upgrade. In 
particular, a process of transition involves four stages of transition: externality recognition, 
resources structuring, resources integration and innovation, and capabilities application. Each 
stage of transition is associated with a firm’s sustained competitive advantage: cognitive 
capability, structuring capability, integrative capability and leveraging capability. The exogenous 
and endogenous factors interplayed at these stages contribute to the malfunction of these four 
capabilities.  
In addition, one of the recurring questions at the heart of strategy and international business 
research is ‘Why do firms fail?’ (see Peng, 2004). Our second contribution adds and extends the 
existing literature on process-based explanations of business failure (Amankwah-Amoah, Boso 
& Antwi-Agyei, 2016). Furthermore, many of the existing studies on organisational failure have 
focused on firms in advanced economies as such little is known about business failure in 
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developing economies in Eastern Europe (Lussier, 2001), China (Yang et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 
2011) and Africa (Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 2014).  
As mentioned above, the aim of this paper is to examine the processes and causes of business 
failure in China, the largest emerging economy in the world. The subject objectives of the study 
are noted in the following key questions: 
• What are the major contributory factors in the interactive process associated with business 
failures?  
• How does the interactive process of exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal) 
factors unfold to precipitate business failure?  
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. The next section presents a review of the 
literature on business failure and DCM. Second, we turn our attention to our research method 
and then set out the findings. The final section discusses implications of the findings. 
Business failure and dynamic capabilities: Towards a process-based perspective  
Strategic and international business research is replete with theories, models and concepts of 
how competitive advantages are gained and lost (e.g. Barney, 1991). Nevertheless, two streams 
of research are particularly relevant in seeking to shed light on the process of interactions leading 
to business failure: the endogenous and exogenous perspectives of business failure, and dynamic 
capabilities. We integrate these two streams of research to develop the construct of DCM. 
What is a business failure? 
The definitions of business failure vary from broad (discontinuance of ownership of the business 
for any reason) to a more narrow (formal bankruptcy proceedings) (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; 
Parsa et al., 2015). Between the discontinuance of business and formal bankruptcy proceedings, 
further definitions have been proposed, for example, termination to prevent further losses, and 
termination with loss of shareholders (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). For example, Shepherd (2003) 
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combines the above two extreme definitions (discontinuity of ownership and bankruptcy) and 
suggests business failure as discontinuity of ownership due to insolvency. Specifically, business 
exit or failure refers to a situation where a host of internal and external factors interact to 
precipitate business decline leading to exit (Shepherd, 2003). In a highly uncertain environment, 
business failure occurs when a firm fails to update and upgrade its resources and expertise base 
to successfully transition from performance decline to create wealth for owners and values for 
customers leading to closure (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015).   
Determinants of business failure 
Regarding the determinants of business failure, there is also clear division that has been reflected 
through theoretical and empirical research. Indeed, there are two schools of thought surrounding 
the topic: the endogenous (voluntarist) and the exogenous (deterministic) views. The exogenous 
view argues that business failure primarily is caused by external factors (e.g. McGanhan & 
Porter, 1997; Stearns et al., 1995). In contrast to the exogenous view, the endogenous school 
believes that managers are principal decision makers for business development (e.g. Hambrick, 
2007; Hall & Young, 1991; Hall, 1992).  
The upper echelon theory argues that a firm’s strategy and subsequent business failure are 
determined by the characteristics of decision makers such as personal characteristics, 
management skills, knowledge and experience of a manager or business owner (Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2004). For instance, Larson and Clute (1979) explore common reasons for business 
failure: personal shortcomings and managerial deficiencies of managers or owners can both lead 
to business failure. For example, Carter and van Auken (2006) argue that one of the most 
common reasons affecting business bankruptcy is managerial deficiencies of owners or managers 
due to lack of management knowledge or experience.  
Building on the exogenous view, three relevant theories include industry organisation (IO), 
organisation ecology (OE) and institution-based view (IBV). The IO scholars argue that business 
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failure should be determined by fortuitous circumstances rather than excellent management 
(Wilkinson & Mellahi, 2004). Specifically, exogenous factors refer to technological uncertainty 
due to innovation, intensive competition from threats of new entrants or existing competitors, 
changes in economic condition, regulatory nature and changes in consumer structure (Baum & 
Singh, 1994; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). These factors, in turn, accelerate the dynamics of an 
industry which further increase the risk of business failure. Indeed, the dynamics of an industry 
include dynamics of the industry structure and boundaries (Sirmon et al., 2007).  
According to OE theory, business failure is primarily determined by four factors: liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), industry lifecycle (Balderston, 1972), population density 
(Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Hannan & Freeman, 1988) and liability of smallness 
(Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988). Indeed, Swaminathan (1996) indicates that established firms are 
more likely to survive in the market than young firms. Industry lifecycle theory suggests that 
business failure should be viewed as the natural endpoint and objective phenomenon (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). Population density refers to the number of organisations within the relevant 
population which affects the rate of business failure (Pal et al., 2006). A high population density 
brings more competition and meanwhile increases legitimation in the market. Pal et al. (2006) 
use a U-shaped relationship to explain that business death starts to fall as legitimacy rises, and 
then increases as competition is increasingly fierce. Liability of smallness refers to the negative 
correlation between the rate of business failure and the size of business. In other words, a small 
firm always has a higher rate of business failure than a large firm (Freeman, et al., 1983; Sutton, 
1997).  
In order to compare the exogenous and endogenous views, an interaction of both factors needs to 
be taken into account (Carter & Van Auken, 2006). Unfortunately, few studies have explained 
what the interaction is or how the interaction of both factors contributes to business failure. This 
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study thus develops a concept of DCM to explain how businesses unfold and thus specifically 
illustrate the interaction of factors leading to business failure.  
Dynamic capabilities malfunction  
For analytical clarity, dynamic capabilities (DCs) refers to a firm’s ability to recognise, renew, 
integrate, recreate and reconfigure their core capabilities and resources in response to the fast-
moving environment to maintain performance (Teece et al., 1997). Similarly, Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000, p. 1107) regard DCs as, “the firm’s processes that use resources to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain and release resources to match and even create market change.” As Goodman 
(1982, p. 45) observed decades ago, “there is no way of getting around the fact that the major 
cause of continued malfunction is management inadequacy”. It is our contention that DCM is at 
the intersection of business failure and dynamic capabilities’ literature. By DCM, we are 
referring to the failure in the resources and capabilities management in the process to integrate, 
reconfigure, recreate and renew (Teece et al., 1997), leading to business failure. Indeed, there are 
some negative factors emphasised by deterministic and voluntarist views which can contribute to 
a firm’s failure in the process of resources and capabilities recognition, renewal, recreation, 
integration and reconfiguration. The breakdown of capabilities and inability to manage a 
transition by carrying over sets of capabilities and resources during one phase of the firm to 
another is what is referred to here as DCM. This ultimately leads to business closure. In order to 
understand the nature of dynamic capabilities better, there are two major issues: the hierarchies 
and the commonalities of DCs (Teece, 2007; Wang et al., 2015; Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
The hierarchies of DCs 
Regarding the hierarchies of DCs, some researchers suggest that DCs should be regarded as 
operational capabilities (Winter, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006). Specifically, they regard DCs as 
another type of operational capabilities which can be regarded as an outcome of the effective 
renewal of operational capabilities and resources that influence a firm’s performance (e.g. 
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Easterby-Smith et al., 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Zott, 2003). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 
1117) suggest that dynamic capabilities should be viewed as another type of operational 
capability and can only be a source of sustained long-term competitive advantage if they are 
applied, “sooner, more astutely, and more fortuitously” than competition to reconfigure 
resources.  
However, many studies initially view DCs as a source of sustained long-term competitive 
advantage (Collis, 1994; Wang et al., 2015). For example, Wang and Ahmed (2007) use a 
“hierarchical” in order to distinguish the differences of resources, capabilities, core capabilities 
and dynamic capabilities (Wang & Ahmed, 2007). Specifically, they put “resources” on the 
“zero-order” element of the hierarchy. Some of resources can be used for competitive advantage 
if they appear to be VRIN.  Nevertheless, the competitive advantages brought by VRIN 
resources may be lost over time; therefore it is necessary for firms to deploy resources into 
capabilities that are “first-order” (Wang & Ahmed, 2007). Core capabilities can be regarded as a 
bundle of capabilities which are put on the “second-order”. However, core capabilities can 
become ‘core rigidities’ over time. The DCs on the third order constantly renew, recreate, 
reconfigure, integrate and coordinate resources, capabilities and core capabilities, as suggested 
by Wang and Ahmed (2007). Thus, DCs can be regarded as “ultimate” operational capabilities 
that are conducive to business failure or success.   
However, a more recent stream of research has stressed that there is no consensus among 
scholars about the way that dynamic capabilities precisely affect organisational success or 
failure. The empirical research of this linkage has been hindered by a lack of agreement on the 
definition of DCs, their measurement and the relationship with firm performance (Protogerou et 
al., 2012). Scholars who regard DCs as another type of operational capability  have suggested an 
indirect link between DCs and business survival (Barreto, 2010). For example, Barreto (2010) 
suggests that several intermediate outcomes can be generated by the impact of DCs and then 
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affect business performance. Protogerou et al. (2012) also suggest that DCs have an indirect 
impact on business performance. They examine whether the impact of DCs on business 
performance is mediated through technological capabilities and operational capabilities. Their 
empirical findings indicate that direct impact on business performance appears to be 
insignificant.  
Nevertheless, there is a strong emphasis initially put on the direct link between DCs and business 
performance (Teece et al., 1997). For example, Symeonidou et al. (2013) argue that the 
management of DCs directly affects business survival. Indeed, they regard configuration of 
capabilities as DCs and then indicate that an effective configuration of R&D, marketing or 
production capability has a strong effect on business survival.  
The commonalities of DCs 
For the second issue about commonalities of DCs across firms, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
suggest that DCs appear to be idiosyncratic, but also they have common features across firms 
which affect business performance. They indicate that resource integration capability, 
reconfiguration capability, and resource acquisition and release capabilities should be regarded 
as the commonalities of DCs. Wang and Ahmed (2007) indicate that absorptive, adaptive and 
innovative capabilities can be the commonalities of DCs cross firms. Sirmon et al. (2007) 
suggest structuring capabilities, bundling capabilities and leveraging capabilities as the 
commonalities of DCs by proposing a dynamic resource management model.  
The three major capabilities include three sub-processes. Specifically, the structuring capabilities 
with acquiring, accumulating and divesting sub-processes refer to the management of the firms’ 
resources portfolio. The acquiring process, including acquisition of intangible resources, tangible 
resources, and complex sets of tangible and intangible resources, contributes to the firm’s ability 
to create value in competition (Denrell et al., 2003). Accumulating is the development of a firm’s 
existing resources. Divesting, as the third sub-process of structuring, refers to the shedding of a 
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firm’s existing resources which are less valued and less effective in contributing to gaining and 
maintaining a firm’s competitive advantage.  
The bundling process refers to the integration of resources to form capabilities within three sub-
processes including stabilising, enriching and pioneering. Indeed, stabilising refers to the process 
of making minor incremental improvements to existing capabilities; enriching refers to extending 
current capabilities; and pioneering refers to the creation of capabilities. The third capability, 
leveraging, refers to the application of a firm’s capability to create owners’ wealth and 
customers’ value by predicting customers’ need and exploiting lucrative opportunities.  
The three sub-processes of leveraging capabilities include mobilising, coordinating and 
deploying. Mobilising means identifying the capabilities and design requisite capability 
configurations needed to exploit opportunities in the market; coordinating refers to combining 
capability configurations; and deploying is physically using capability configurations to support 
leveraging strategy, which includes the resource advantage strategy, market opportunity strategy 
or entrepreneurial strategy. As Sirmon et al. (2007) argued, the three capabilities within their 
sub-processes are critical for business survival.  
Regarding these two issues, the following suggestion of Teece et al. (1997) on the hierarchies of 
DCs takes the initial view that DCs are “ultimate” capabilities of renewing, existing or creating 
new resources and capabilities which directly lead to business failure. Moreover, although there 
is no consensus on the commonalities of DCs, most of the current work as mentioned above 
emphasises the importance of environment recognition (adaptive capability/absorptive 
capability), resource evolution (structuring capability), resource integration (integrative 
capability/innovative capability) and capability application (configuring capability/leveraging 
capability) in DCs management (Barreto, 2010; Protogerou et al., 2012; Wang & Ahmed, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2015). This study thus suggests four capabilities: cognitive capability, structuring 
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capability, integrative capability and leveraging capability as the commonalities of DCs. The 
four capabilities are frequently emphasized by DCs management in terms of current literature. 
Specifically, cognitive capability refers to the ability of firms to sense and analyse fast-moving 
changes efficiently in the market. Structuring capability refers to the ability of firms to 
effectively acquire needed resources and stabilise their current resources. Integrative capability 
refers to the ability of firms to integrate resources effectively to enrich current capabilities or 
create new capabilities. Leveraging capability refers to the ability of firms to apply capabilities 
needed to diffuse customers’ values and thus create owner’s wealth.  
However, an interaction of some factors emphasised by exogenous and endogenous views can 
occur in these four capabilities and contributes to DCM. The understanding of the DCM 
associated with business failure is especially limited in existing literature. This study thus seeks 
to explore the research question “How do business failures unfold?” by developing a concept of 
DCM to link business failure, as indicated in Figure 1. This study uses a narrative approach to 
reveal the micro-level mechanisms and processes of business failure at the level of individual 
lived experience.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Research method 
 
Research design  
In light of limited prior scholarly works on the process leading to business failure and interactive 
effects of external and internal factors, we adopted a qualitative approach (Edmondson & 
McManus, 2007; Yin, 2009). By qualitative analyses, we relied on semi-structured interviews to 
assemble our data. Semi-structured interview is a qualitative method of inquiry that uses a pre-
designed set of open-ended questions (questions that prompt discussion) with the opportunity for 
the researcher to focus on some particular themes (Wengraf, 2001). This open-ended questioning 
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and discovery-oriented approach makes the interviewers enter into a dialogue with respondents, 
regulating the scope to explore research issues for researchers while also giving interviewees 
freedom to respond to the issues using their own words (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
Moreover, semi-structured interviews allow the time available to be controlled for interviewees 
in a dialogue with respondents (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Wengraf, 2001). The interview schedule 
uses pre-designed categories of interview questions to guide the data collection in the qualitative 
analysis phase, ensuring all perspectives of the causes and effects of business failure, as outlined 
in the literature review section, can be discussed. Indeed, this approach has been found to be 
effective when exploring complex issues with limited prior research (e.g. Osemeke & Adegbite, 
2016). We adopted a narrative research approach which can provide a clear sequential order by 
connecting events. The narratives can contain temporal information about when and how certain 
events unfold and the effects of these events on subsequent happenings (Singh et al., 2015). The 
approach also helps in the identification of patterns and unfolding dynamics (Singh et al., 2015). 
Thus, building on the approach, we collected and analysed stories of failure to answer the 
research question of ‘‘How does the interaction unfold to contribute to business failure in 
China?’’  
Informants for this study were identified through snowball sampling whereby the sample 
population was sourced from, “cases of interest from people who know people who know 
people, who know what cases are information-rich, that is, good examples for study, good 
interview subjects” (Patton, 1990, p. 182). A list of failed businesses was provided by relevant 
informants including the local industrial and commercial bureau, local chamber of commerce, 
and individuals. Informants were asked to nominate the potential candidates for the study and 
nominees were subsequently asked to nominate other potential candidates until no new nominees 
arose. Then, all qualified nominees who satisfied sample criteria were to participate in our study 
through telephone. This approach has also been found to be very effective when exploring 
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complex issues such as this and using elites/business owners (Welch et al., 2002).The nature of 
the questions revolving around how and why businesses failed in the Chinese market were 
divided into two phases. The first phase is labelled ‘‘pre-transition/upgrade”, which refers to the 
time period wherein entrepreneurs intend to do business transition/upgrade because of 
uncertainties that occurred in changes of economy, politics or technology. The second phase is 
described as “experiencing failure in transition and upgrading” and it illustrates how business 
failure unfolded under business transition/upgrade.   
A total of 64 failed entrepreneurs from 50 failed companies agreed to participate. Most of the 
businessmen and women owned mid-sized private firms and experienced failure in the transition 
phase. This study views business failure as discontinuation of the business due to inability to 
make a successful transition to a new business model. Further information about the sample is 
provided in Table 1. In addition, the basic information including the real names of interviewees 
and failed firms have been changed to ensure confidentially. Purposive sampling was conducted 
by selecting information-rich examples for this study. In addition, 6 government officials who 
work in banks and economic departments were also interviewed to provide rich information 
about determinants of business failure. The time period of business failure was restricted to the 
past ten years to ensure the timeliness of information. Data for 2015 were collected through in-
depth semi-structured interviews which lasted between 60 and 80 minutes. Permission to record 
the interview was requested before each interview commenced. Only one interviewee refused to 
use the recording pen from a total of 50 interviewees. The record and transcriptions were made 
timeously after each interview.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
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Data analysis 
Regarding data analysis, we adopted the following steps. The first stage was to construct a 
chronology for each failed entrepreneur and his/her story. This allowed us to explore a collective 
story of failed businesses. Based on the content analysis, we identified common and divergent 
themes from the informants’ responses. In the second stage, the data were coded and grouped 
into first- and second-order categories. In the third stage of data analysis, we reviewed each 
interview and then expanded the open codes into more elaborated codes by employing analytical 
memos. Eventually, we moved on to theorising which allowed us to create models to reveal the 
process and mechanisms of business failure suggested by the data. We then returned some 
transcripts to some informants for clarification before data analysis. 
Findings and analysis 
This novel study uncovered that business failure could occur at four stages: externality 
recognition, resources structuring, resources integration and innovation, and capabilities 
application. We found that business failure at each of these stages was associated with a 
particular outcome: low sensitivity and inadequate understanding to malfunction of cognitive 
capability, less-effective resources acquisition and internal resources loss to malfunction of 
structuring capability, less-effective resources development and innovation to malfunction of 
integrative capability, and failure of diffusion of customer value to malfunction of leveraging 
capability. Figure 2 shows a summary of categories and associated themes.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
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The first phase: Motives of business transition/upgrade  
We found that the processes of capabilities upgrade contributed to business failure. The motive 
of firms’ transition or upgrade was due to a highly uncertain environment, which then represents 
the first phase in the quest to upgrade their capabilities. The high degree of uncertainty generated 
by environmental changes pushed some of the owners of firms in the traditional manufacturing 
and low-tech sector to seek to transition/upgrade for their survival. According to one 
entrepreneur who experienced business failure in Shenzhen: 
“Since centre government opened parts of market in military industry for POEs 
in 2014, we tried to transfer our current business into this industry by 
developing and upgrading high value-added products and services…” (F025)   
The study shows that the highly uncertain environment was driven by IO factors such as 
economic slowdown, internet development and an anti-corruption campaign, and further affected 
the behaviour and action of decision makers. First, the study revealed that the rebalance of 
China’s economic structure has brought some uncertainties and challenges into businesses. 
Following a slump in fixed investment and a slowdown in export benefits, China’s economic 
downturn has made many traditional businesses slide into serious decline. Indeed, the growth 
rate in the real estate industry has dramatically decreased to only 1% in 2015 from 19.8% in 
2013 (Haitong International Securities (HIS), 2015). High debts and excessive capacity in the 
sector from steel and coal further affected the profitability. Due to the effects of less-effective 
economies in the upstream, many businesses attempted to change their target market through 
transition for their survival. As one failed entrepreneur in Beijing (F041) indicated:   
“The slowdown of economy also affected our business … the number of offers 
was decreasing in last two years due to decline investment in SOEs…As a 
result, we tried to transfer our target from and renew our services for survival.”  
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Our findings suggest that under huge pressure from overcapacity and high debt, many traditional 
businesses are experiencing decline. However, according to one Statistical Report on Internet 
Development in China 2015, issued by China Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC), the 
number of internet users in China increased to about 649 million in 2014 (CINIC, 2015). The 
utilisation of the mobile phone as a means of accessing the internet reached 85.8% in 2014 
(CINIC, 2015). Moreover, the scale of online shoppers was over 361 million in 2014, up from 
the figure of nearly 302 million in 2013 (CINIC, 2015). Similarly, the internet-adoption rate 
among China’s SMEs only was about 20% to 25% compared with 72% to 85% of SMEs in the 
US (McKinsey, 2015). As one failed entrepreneur in Shenzhen (F039) concurred, noting the 
influence of the internet: 
“I engaged in traditional retailing with a physical store in Shenzhen in 2010… 
however, high labour cost made us have to bear a heavy financial burden…I 
think the rise of online business that provides a new opportunity with us. 
Furthermore, more and more competitors also closed their physical stores and 
transferred their business from offline to online…that’s why I transferred my 
business from offline to online in 2014.”   
The findings indicate that instability in politics also contributed to a highly uncertain 
environment. Since 2012, the central government has being holding a massive anti-corruption 
campaign. By the end of 2015, 100 high-ranking officials had been accused of bribery and abuse 
of power (CHINADAILY, 2015). Over 100,000 people from politics and business have been 
indicted for corruption (The Economist, 2015). In the long term, the anti-corruption campaign 
may be positive for China’s economy by tackling work in SOEs to break up monopolies and 
push market liberalisation (The Economist, 2015).  
Nevertheless, in the short term, the “political earthquake” has generated feelings of fear in many 
officials and politicians, and caused further uncertainty in business. Many officials only want to 
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keep their post and believe “not acting” is the best way to avoid more troubles and uncertainties 
in this campaign. According to Yang (2015), officials’ inaction made them passive and slow 
moving in business service. Many of the entrepreneurs also complained about the impact on their 
businesses of officials “not acting”. Some of them even attempted to make a transition for their 
survival under the impact of “political earthquake”. One failed entrepreneur in Beijing illustrated 
the effects of political changes on her business:   
“New market policy and anti-corruption campaign weakens a relationship 
between government and firms. In short term, less opportunities and supports 
we could gain from government. In face of the changes, we tried to upgrade our 
current product into high value-added product and transfer our market 
target…” (F025, one failed entrepreneur in Beijing) 
The second phase: Process-based explanations  
Malfunction of cognitive capability (The first stage) 
Our analysis suggests that malfunction of cognitive capability here implies that the firm fails to 
understand new changes and uncertainties from the external environment efficiently and 
effectively. Two themes emerged to shed light on the determinants of cognitive capability 
malfunction and the research labels them “low sensitivity to external changes” and “weak 
analysis to dynamics”.  
By low sensitivity to external changes, we are referring to the firm’s lack of flexibility and 
sensitivity to external dynamics so that the firm cannot efficiently take actions to respond to the 
external changes. In a highly uncertain environment, the low sensitivity easily makes firms 
ignore the potential risks from the changes in environment. As a result, a firm cannot efficiently 
avoid the potential risks that may affect its survival. According to one failed entrepreneur from 
Beijing:  
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“… if we could do transition earlier maybe we could avoid failure …I think our 
failure came from a low sensitivity on industrial change. We were too slow in 
face of external change and failed to efficiently respond to the uncertainties in 
market…in fact, many traditional media took advantage of internet technology 
and successfully achieved transformation in that time. However, it was too late 
when we were aware of the importance of business transition…” (F008) 
On the other hand, weak analysis of dynamics implies that a firm has a weak analysis of external 
changes so that firm cannot fully understand the effects of the changes to its survival and 
development. As one entrepreneur indicated:  
“Our failure comes from a low sensitivity and a weak analytical ability on 
external changes. This made us ignore the effects of external risks to our 
business…We failed to efficiently take actions to handle the changes. We never 
thought how big pressure the changes brought to us.” (F042)  
Determinants of low sensitivity to external changes  
The data indicate that low sensitivity to external changes could be caused by an interaction of 
some internal and external factors. Specifically, the internal factors include closed culture and 
centralisation, overconfidence, and a lack of risk consciousness. The external factor comes from 
information asymmetry that is related to less-effective public services.  
Regarding closed culture to low sensitivity, the beliefs and values are influential to individual 
decisions and behaviours in business operation. Our analysis suggests that closed culture and 
centralization were closely associated with failed firms. The culture can lower flexibility and 
sensitivity of decision makers to external changes. Consequently, they failed to take actions 
efficiently to handle the changes in environment. 
“A closed culture we had in top management … we failed to share some 
valuable information with each other on time. In addition, there was a high 
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centralization in decision making…This lowered our sensitivity to changes in 
market.” (F010) 
Overconfidence in this context refers to overestimation of one’s own ability relative to others 
(Koellinger et al., 2007). Overconfidence of decision makers can produce rigid behaviours which 
further affect business development (Finkelstein, 2003). This is highly likely to contribute to 
business owners making poor decisions in business operations. The data suggest that 
overconfidence can lower the sensitivity of decision makers to external changes, thereby 
affecting business transition. As one failed entrepreneur in Tianjin noted:   
“We were overly overoptimistic because of past success… a low sensitivity on 
industrial changes made us underestimate the effects of external risks at 
beginning of business upgrade” (F014)  
Another one top manager who worked with entrepreneur F024 in Shenzhen also added,    
“…we overly replied on the experience from past success …even if there was a 
fast-moving change in environment, we still made a judgement based on 
previous experience and felt very confident to deal with it…in fact, we did not 
prepare enough to deal with the changes…we were less sensitive to the change 
and underestimated the effects of externality on our business due to 
overconfidence…” (F024a)                                                                                                                                                                         
The impact of low-risk consciousness and emotional instability are frequently emphasized by the 
failed entrepreneurs. The findings indicate that low-risk consciousness led to low sensitivity of 
decision makers to fast-moving changes in industry. One failed entrepreneur in Beijing 
emphasized the failure to handle industry dynamics efficiently: 
“A lack of risk consciousness on external changes made me ignore the risks in 
market especially for the rise of competitors. After the rise of iPhone and its 
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Apple store, more and more businessmen started to rethink their business model 
based on the development of mobile internet. However, we seemed to be less 
sensitive on the industrial change and did not prepare enough to respond to the 
change in market …” (F011)    
Information asymmetry refers to inequalities between the information held by stakeholders in the 
market (Dai et al., 2013). Piotroski and Wong (2012) discussed the information environment in 
the Chinese market. They indicated that high information asymmetry and a lack of quality public 
information still exist in the Chinese market. As a result, some managers or investors have to 
rely on private information channels through building a close relationship with people who have 
an information advantage in the market. The problem of information asymmetry contributes to a 
higher cost of communication. SOEs in China could have less information asymmetry due to the 
close relationship with authorities (Huang et al., 2015).  
For SMEs, the problem of information asymmetry may increase their financial burden. Our 
analysis suggests that a high information asymmetry results in decision makers/owners failing to 
gain relevant information efficiently, therefore affecting the effectiveness of business transition. 
Entrepreneurs and top managers complained that it is not easy to access information about 
policies and technology. The shortage of transparent service information in support systems 
lowered firms’ sensitivity to environmental changes. One failed entrepreneur commented about 
his previous business:  
“During business transition, we hoped to collect much information about 
external changes from third party … however, we had to give up this idea 
because of a high price the public services asked …we did not step up our 
vigilance on external risks without support from public services” (F021)         
One governor from the National Statistical Bureau commented:  
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“I think the unfairness between public and private firms lies in information 
asymmetry… SOEs are able to get more information resources from the market. 
Therefore, it is difficult for private economies to take actions.” (M001) 
Determinants of weak analysis on dynamics  
The study indicates that internal factors include knowledge or experience deficits, 
overconfidence and composition of TMT. External factors include frequent changes of 
regulations and less-effective public services. Our fieldwork indicates that deficits in 
management knowledge are one of the most important contributory factors to business failure. A 
weak analytical ability to dynamics changes in the business environment is associated with the 
deficits of knowledge and experience. One failed entrepreneur from Shenzhen indicated the 
importance of knowledge and experience to an effective analysis of external changes:  
“I think individual deficits in knowledge and experience made us underestimate 
the effects of changes and risks in environment including economic downturn, 
technological development, customer behaviour, and competitors’ actions” 
(F042)    
The study indicates that overconfidence of decision makers affected the sensitivity of decision 
makers to external changes but. A weak analysis to dynamics made firms fail to take actions for 
their survival and development in response to external changes. One failed entrepreneur from 
Shenzhen commented:   
“We enjoyed big successes, but ignored team building and rise of competitors. 
The overconfidence hid our eyes so that we did not care rapid changes in 
market.” (F047)   
Regarding the contribution of the composition of TMT to business failure, the study noted that 
homogenous teams may lead to limited scope for decision makers. Compared with 
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heterogeneous teams, homogenous teams are not beneficial to decision makers in fully 
understanding external changes. Heterogeneous teams are able to gather information from a 
variety of sources and provide diverse interpretations in decision making. One failed 
entrepreneur in Beijing indicated:  
“I think the composition of team is a big issue for my previous business. In our 
team, all members have a similar background… for example, we are close to 40 
years old and few people accepted high education…young manager in our team 
was lacking…The age group was hard to understand the changes in young 
customers’ preference and technology…this is one of reasons that made us miss 
the right time for products upgrade…” (F021)   
Regarding the frequent changes in regulations which impact business performance, it has been 
noted that inconsistent regulations affect business growth (Zhu et al., 2011). The findings 
demonstrate that the frequent changes of policies and regulations generate more uncertainties 
under a highly uncertain environment. This made it difficult for decision makers to make an 
effective analysis of external changes. When asked about the impact of deficient regulations and 
laws on business survival one governor in Hangzhou commented:  
“The frequent change in regulation and policy is normal in China. It did bring 
more uncertainties into business operation… for example, I know some 
companies they are encouraged by government’s policy to make investments on 
some projects. However, only after one year, the policy was cancelled by 
government and many of the investors and developers have to bear a loss with a 
little compensation.” (M004) 
The less-effective pubic service to weak analysis of dynamics can be primarily 
reflected on less-effective consulting services for China’s SMEs. As Zhu et al. 
(2010) indicated, many SMEs find it difficult to improve their analysis of dynamics 
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due to less-effective public services. For example, innovation intermediaries are 
necessary for some SMEs that try to upgrade their businesses. These SMEs should 
have gained some useful information and professional services from the 
intermediaries. However, due to less professional service and high cost, few SMEs 
can gain effective supports from public services to help them better understand 
industrial changes and risks in market. The data show that the less-effective public 
service cannot help SMEs improve their analytical ability for better understanding 
industrial risks and changes. As one entrepreneur F033 from Shanghai noted, 
“Although many public services can provide professional analysis in sector and 
macroeconomic environment, very little is known about how the change will 
affect SMEs in Market. I think most of their clients are MNEs or SOEs. Their 
analysis always regard these firms as research target. That’s why I think many 
public services are difficult to help us better understand the effects of industrial 
changes and risks to us…in addition, some research analysts in these 
institutions are not very professional…many of them just do analysis based on 
fixed framework…” (F033) 
Malfunction of structuring capability (The second stage)  
Malfunction of structuring capability refers to firms which cannot effectively acquire and 
manage essential resources for their survival and development. In terms of research findings, two 
themes that surfaced in the stage of resources structuring were about determinants of structuring 
capability malfunction and the research labels them “Less-effective resources acquisition” and 
“Internal resources loss”.  
Less-effective resources acquisition implies that firms cannot effectively acquire needy resources 
from within the market to help them reconstruct their core capabilities in a highly uncertain 
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environment. This hampers firms’ upgrading or transition due to difficulties with resource 
acquisition. As one failed entrepreneur from Hangzhou added: 
“More and more traditional businesses were trying to transfer their businesses 
from offline to online …However, less resources could be shared when more 
firms enter into this industry…” (F036)           
Internal resources loss implies that firms fail to manage, allocate and control internal resources 
effectively. The findings suggest that internal resources loss not only made it difficult for firms 
to maintain current capabilities, but also affected new capabilities’ construction during transition 
or upgrade. One failed entrepreneur from Beijing indicated:  
“From my own failed experience…Learning how to avoid or reduce loss of 
resources is essential for business survival…We failed to manage and control 
our resources so that we lost some resources that were essential for business 
transition.”(F023)    
Determinants of “Less-effective resources acquisition”  
The data suggest that financing difficulty is one of the most important factors that contributes to 
Less-effective resources acquisition, especially for SMEs (OECD, 2008). Despite SMEs 
contributing over 60% GDP to China’s economy, they still face significant barriers in financing 
(Tsai, 2015). According to Tsai (2015), only 23.2% of bank credits were given to SMEs and only 
4.7% of short-term loans. One failed entrepreneur from one firm in Shenzhen indicated:    
“A lack of financial support made me really worry about the high labour 
cost. As a result, I had to lay off some employees for cost saving.” (F019)  
Determinants of “Internal resources loss”  
The present study indicate individual emotion, a lack of long-term strategy, poor financial 
management, closed culture, and psychological unbalance lead to resource loss from internal 
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management. Externally, less-effective supervision mechanism and vicious competition is one of 
most important factor to contribute to resource loss.   
Emotional instability of the decision makers is one of the personal shortcomings which affect 
business operation (Parsa et al., 2015). The findings indicate that the emotional instability of 
entrepreneurs generated additional uncertainty in team cohesion and talent management. This 
further led to resource loss internally. According to one failed entrepreneur from Beijing: 
“Our leader was very impatient and emotional to their (top managers) 
performance. For example, he always hoped that new managers could 
immediately show their values for business transition. If they cannot show their 
values within a short term, our leader easily became very impatient them…some 
of managers even were sacked quickly without a formal reason…I think you 
need to give employees much patience and time, especially in business 
transition” (F001) 
The analysis indicates that a lack of clear strategy could contribute to resource loss (e.g. financial 
hardship; brain drain) which affects firms’ resource structuring in a highly uncertain 
environment, (see Table 2). The table also indicates that closed culture and individual 
psychological unbalance (e.g., fantasy, idealization) led to resource loss and affected resource 
integration and innovation.  
Poor financial management encompasses poor cash-flow management, poor debt controlling, 
inadequate sales, poor financial records and high operating expenses (Carter & Van Auken, 
2006). Many of the failed entrepreneurs emphasized the importance of cash-flow management 
when asked about the most important factors in their business failure. As D’Aveni (1989) 
argued, effective cash-flow management can forecast future cash requirements so as to avoid a 
crisis of liquidity. However, poor cash-flow forecasting can lead to a loss of resources and thus 
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affect business survival and development (Zacharakis et al., 1999). One failed entrepreneur from 
a firm in Beijing added:  
“An effective financial management should have been established. For my own 
experience, few companies have developed a good financial management 
system especially in SMEs…This easily caused a waste of resources…for my 
business, we also suffered a loss due to poor financial management.” (F023)      
 
The data indicate that a loss of talent in top management always occurred due to less-effective 
supervision mechanisms and vicious competition in market. Specifically, some SOEs 
deliberately offered a high salary to attract talent from SMEs. Some failed entrepreneurs 
complained that the salary offered by those SOEs was much higher than the average salary in 
industry. Due to the lack of an effective supervision mechanism in the labour market, a higher 
labour cost was incurred by the vicious competition. When asked about deficiency of regulations 
and laws, a failed entrepreneur in Shenzhen commented:       
“Some big companies (SOEs) grabbed our technique managers by offering an 
extreme high salary. It is almost eight times higher than our pay…At start, we 
also try to rise our pay for some talents during transition…However, we had to 
give it up finally…due to a lack of effective supervision mechanism, we had to 
bear a price war in labour market…This not only improved our labour cost but 
also contributed to brain drain in our company. Finally, talents crisis in our 
company led to a frequent changes of top management which affect our 
transition and survival.” (F041) 
Malfunction of integrative capability (The third stage) 
Malfunction of integrative capability implies that firms cannot effectively integrate essential 
resources for capability construction which further affects product and service innovation in 
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value creation for customers. Based on the research findings, the theme “failure of resources 
integration and innovation for capabilities construction”, refers to firms failing to integrate 
current resources effectively to maintain, enrich or create new capabilities in a highly uncertain 
environment. The failure of resource integration and innovation results in firms failing to 
develop their core capabilities to address the risks and uncertainties generated by the external 
environment. One failed entrepreneur from Beijing indicated: 
“For my failed experience, how to effectively allocate and integrate some 
resources for products and services innovation was a big challenge during 
business transition. The failure of resources integration made us lose 
competitiveness in market which finally led tour business failure.” (F007) 
Determinants of less-effective resource integration and innovation  
The findings suggest that the failure in resource integration for capabilities construction can be 
caused by an interaction of internal and external factors in terms of OS and IBV perspectives. 
Specifically, the internal factors include closed culture and centralization, deficits of knowledge 
and experience, and composition of TMT. The external factor comes from a deficiency of 
regulations and laws that consists of less-effective protection of non-technological innovation 
and invisible assets, and less-effective supervision mechanisms for competition.  
As Herzog and Leker (2010) argued, individual centralization in decision making can affect a 
firm’s innovative capability. The findings suggest that closed culture and centralization are not 
beneficial to resource integration and innovation. As one failed entrepreneur from Shanghai 
indicated:  
“Honestly, our team was really strong at start and we also did not need to 
worry about financial support. However, our team failed to integrate these 
resources into firm’s competitive advantage in competition. I think it is because 
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that our leader was too centralised in decision making, especially during in 
business transition. He always rejected some good ideas and suggestions from 
other managers.” (F008)         
Second, the findings suggest that knowledge and experience deficits affect resource integration 
for capabilities construction which created customer values. When asked the effects of 
knowledge and experience to business failure, one failed entrepreneur in Beijing indicated:  
“We did lose some resources as I said before. However, our failure was 
primarily related to a lack of ability in resources integration and 
innovation…For example, it seemed to be difficult to produce some good ideas 
in services innovation. Take me as an example, I thought I was more suitable to 
the role in marketing or product design. However, our leader gave me a job as 
head of office in company. Some managers like me also were not suitable to 
their roles during business upgrade…this made us difficult to maximize our own 
values to business, especially in product innovation…I think it was due to a lack 
of individual experiences in personnel arrangements for decision maker…In 
other words, our leader failed to fully activate employees’ potential by 
providing some essential supports during business upgrade.” (F019)    
It has been noted that a heterogeneous team is conducive to a high level of innovation and 
creativity (Somech, 2006). Specifically, different perspectives in a heterogeneous group lead to 
innovation, novelty and comprehension in the set of recommended solutions. However, a high 
level of heterogeneity does not come without disadvantages. The findings indicate that a 
homogenous team was not beneficial to resource integration and innovation. When asked about 
the effects of composition of TMT to business survival and development, one failed entrepreneur 
from Shenzhen commented:  
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“We had a homogenous team. Except for our leader, other people with 
similar background seemed to be hard to have new ideas in product 
upgrade and development…” (F045)                
The study noted that weakness of property rights, lack of concrete regulations at operational 
level, inconsistent regulations, extra entry barriers and lack of regulations for non-technological 
innovation lead to a weak innovative capability in the Chinese market (Zhu et al., 2011). The 
study uncovered that less-effective protection of non-technological innovation and invisible 
assets are still an issue which affects business survival and development in the Chinese market. 
Specifically, the protection of innovation primarily focuses on the technological side—either 
product or process innovations. Although Chinese authorities have noted the deficiency of 
regulations and laws on non-technological innovations such as business model innovation and 
service innovation, the relevant regulations and laws are lacking so far. Furthermore, some 
concrete regulations for the protection of invisible assets, such as trademarks, copyrights or 
patents, are still incomplete.  
The findings indicate that the less-effective protection of non-technological innovation and 
invisible assets further affects resource integration and innovation for maintaining or upgrading 
capabilities in a highly uncertain environment. In particular, less-effective protection of non-
technological innovation and invisible assets result in some entrepreneurs and managers losing 
confidence to innovate. When asked what the effects were of a lack of protection on non-
technological innovation to business survival and development, one failed entrepreneur from 
Shanghai recalled:  
“Except for individual factors, I think the protection on non-technological innovation is still lacking in 
market. Some competitors easily imitated or even copied our product design. This made us struggle with 
products innovation…I mean we lost the positivity of innovation in long run…” (F008) 
One failed entrepreneur in Shenzhen noted:     
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“Although we suffered a loss in human resources, we tried to develop some 
online products…however, a lack of institutional supports made product R&D 
come to be more difficult. Specifically, the protection of intellectual property 
rights is less-effective…for example, we took more than one year on a lawsuit 
about infringement disputes that one firm illegally used our brand name and 
patent in 2013. This made us waste much time on lawsuit. What’s more, this 
made us lose passion and patience in products R&D. We invested and lost a lot 
resources, but we still insisted to do R&D. However, no one can protect our 
property right in face of many copycats and SOEs in the market…” (F024)     
The lack of complete regulations and laws on non-technological innovation and invisible assets 
lowers firms’ confidence and positivity in relation to product and service innovation. However, 
the less-effective supervision mechanism directly unbridled some firms, allowing them to make 
profits through vicious competition. Although relevant commercial laws and regulations on 
market competition have been enacted by government in China, they fail to be strictly enforced 
for a variety of political, socio-cultural, institutional and historical reasons (Luo et al., 2011). 
This enforcement uncertainty and variability can be partly attributed to long traditions of a lack 
of independent law enforcement and frequent changes of unjustified regulations. Therefore, the 
deficiency of supervision mechanisms in markets makes it difficult to protect the long-term 
interests of many private enterprises in the Chinese market (Luo et al., 2011). Under these weak 
systems and other personal issues, many enterprises, especially SMEs, are inclined to pursue 
short-term interests. Being copycats gives many SMEs opportunities to achieve rapid short-term 
returns through cost advantages and channel advantages. 
The findings indicate that many firms in the Chinese market copied other firms’ products and 
services due to the lack of an effective supervision mechanism. This made some good firms lose 
motivation for product and service innovation. What’s worse, this issue finally contributed to 
vicious competition in the Chinese market. The vicious competition, in turn, weakens firms’ 
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integrative and innovative capabilities. When asked what effects the supervision mechanism had 
on business survival and development, one failed entrepreneur from Hangzhou indicated:  
“As an e-retailer, there are two ways to survive. One way is to anticipate a 
‘price war’. Another way is to focus on service innovation. Indeed, most e-
retailers prefer to participate ‘price war’ rather than doing ‘R&D’ due to less-
effective supervision mechanism…we did not form an innovative environment in 
last few decades…for us, we also had to anticipate an intensive ‘price war’ in 
market. This made us fail to develop an innovative capability in a long term…” 
(F036)      
When asked what the effects were of the supervision mechanism and vicious competition on 
business failure, one failed entrepreneur recalled:  
“We initially insisted to do a differentiated strategy and focused on 
product innovation. However, we finally failed to resist the huge pressure 
from vicious competition… we cannot develop our innovative capability 
under less-effective protection from monitoring department…This is one 
of the most important reason to contribute to our final failure…” (F044) 
Malfunction of leveraging capability (The last stage) 
Malfunction of leveraging capability refers to firms that fail to apply firm’s capabilities 
configurations effectively to diffuse customer value and create wealth for owners (Aragon-
Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2007). The data suggest that the malfunction of 
leveraging capability is due to “failure of diffusion in customer value”. Therefore, the theme 
“failure of diffusion in customer value” is labelled in the research.  
The theme refers to firms that fail to diffuse the value creation effectively for customers in the 
market, although some capabilities have been constructed through resources integration and 
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innovation. Therefore, the failure of diffusion in customer value can lead to firm’s failure in 
application of core capabilities in the market. One failed entrepreneur from Beijing indicated:  
“There are some resistance in diffusing customer value…for example, some of 
competitors copied our business model but failed to provide a good service with 
customers. This may make some potential customers difficult to trust our 
services especially for online business…” (F020) 
Determinants of failure of diffusion in customer value 
The analysis indicates that the failure of diffusion in customer value can be caused by a less-
effective supervision mechanism which is emphasized by the IBV perspective. The study 
indicates that some firms effectively renewed and upgraded their capabilities and developed new 
products and services in highly uncertain environments. However, they still suffered business 
failure because of some malicious gossip created by other competitors. Due to the less-effective 
supervision mechanism in the market, customers easily lost trust in firms during their diffusion 
in customer value. One failed entrepreneur from Beijing provided an insight into the effects of 
the less-effective supervision mechanism to customers’ value diminishing:  
“Some companies even made some malicious actions to compete with us. 
For Example, one of our competitors deliberately created a rumour that 
we sell fakes to customers. This made some potential customers discredit 
our products within short term. Under a less-effective supervision 
mechanism in the market, some competitors that adopt such behaviours 
made us lose some potential customers online…” (F004)                                                                                              
One official who works in the department of SMEs in Economic Information Committee in 
Fuzhou stated:    
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“It is difficult for us to conduct an effective market surveillance…I think there 
are two reasons. First, you know, there is a special relationship between SOEs 
and us… sorry I cannot say too much about that…Another reason is associated 
with characteristics of industry. For example, it is more difficult for us to 
conduct an effective supervision in online industry.” (M005)        
A process of business failure 
Findings from the collective story of failed ventures revealed a process, as shown in Figure 2. 
The figure illustrates how some exogenous and endogenous interact to contribute to DCM and it 
led to final business failure. The malfunction of cognitive capability can occur when a firm has a 
low sensitivity to and weak analysis of external changes. In particular, some adverse factors 
emphasised by endogenous and exogenous perspectives interplayed to contribute to a low 
sensitivity and weak analysis that led to malfunction of cognitive capability. This accelerates the 
malfunction in structuring capability. An interviewee noted: 
“During business transition, we did not have a clear understanding to external 
changes due to a low sensitivity…As a result, we missed the best time. What’s 
worse, this made us waste more resources for business transition late… ” 
(F015, one failed entrepreneur in Shenzhen)  
Constructing competitive capabilities through resources integration and innovation was less 
likely to be implemented due to malfunction of structuring capability. Indeed, resource support 
such as advanced equipment, laboratories, sufficient capital, and quality human capital can be 
viewed as a basic condition for capabilities construction. In turn, the malfunction of integrative 
capability produced negative emotion to contribute to resource loss. It is dangerous for business 
survival and development because the negativity could make managers lose their confidence in 
the long term. According to one respondent when asked about the effects of resources 
structuring: 
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“The financing difficulty and a high labour cost produced many barriers to our 
transition. A lack of capital support made us hard to execute the next plan. 
Indeed, it came to be difficult for us to buy some good patents from research 
institutions to support our product R&D…on the other hand, less-effective 
innovation lowered the positivity and confidence of some researchers and 
developers…many of them left our company quickly…This led to our failure 
finally” (F025, one failed entrepreneur, Beijing) 
One interviewee stated when asked about the effects of integrative and innovative capabilities:   
“Except for vicious competition and top management team, a weak innovative 
capability also was due to a lack of essential resources. For example, it was 
difficult to hire some qualified technology managers who can help us upgrade 
our products…the failure of innovation always is risky for us…because this 
means a loss of resources…not only financial resources but also includes time 
and energy…” (F040, one failed entrepreneur, Shenzhen)     
The data indicate that some firms gained sufficient resources and had a strong team, but they still 
suffered failure in resource integration and innovation due to an interaction of external and 
internal factors (see Figure 3). Others suffered malfunction of integrative capability due to 
interplay of external and internal factors and the effects of malfunction of structuring capability. 
The failure of constructing capabilities made firms fail to apply capabilities needed to diffuse 
customer value and therefore contributed to the malfunction of leveraging capability. The 
malfunction of integrative capabilities made it difficult for departments to coordinate with each 
other in configuring capabilities needed to diffuse customer value in the market. In turn, 
malfunction of leveraging capability caused conflicts in internal management which was not 
beneficial to capabilities construction. According to our interviewees: 
“Due to some internal and external factors, operational department failed to 
develop a strong communication mechanism and IT department also failed to 
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design new products…This made our competitiveness fail to be built…as a 
result, we failed to create values for customers under a fast-moving change in 
environment…”  (F027, one failed entrepreneur Shanghai)     
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our research aim was to examine how the interactions of firm-level and external factors unfold 
to shape the processes leading to business failure. This study returns to the theory to motivate 
more precisely what  the issues are that remain unresolved in relation to the study of business 
failure, and why this thesis needs to solve them. As noted earlier, although some studies have 
suggested that any explanation of business failure is not complete without explicating the 
interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors (Amankwah-Amoah & Zhang, 2015; Desai, 
2011; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004, 2010), the micro-level mechanisms and processes of the 
interaction leading to business failure remain largely unexplored. This study examined what the 
interaction is, and how the interaction unfolds to contribute to business failure by developing 
new concepts in current integrative theories. Indeed, we extend prior research by developing a 
construct of DCM to explain how the interactive processes can precipitate business failure. 
Using insights from failed Chinese entrepreneurs, we identified that the interactions of 
exogenous and endogenous factors on transitions leading to business failure entail cognitive 
capability malfunction, structuring capability malfunction, capabilities construction malfunction, 
and capabilities leveraging malfunction.  
Specifically, the findings showed that business failure can occur due to the DCM. The process of 
business failure is not a simple interaction between internal and external factors, but a complex 
and consecutive process embedded in the management of DCs. the management of DCs consists 
of four stages (aspects): externality recognition, resource structuring, resources integration and 
 36 
 
innovation, and capabilities application. Each stage corresponds to specific dynamic capabilities 
respectively. Indeed, externality recognition corresponds to cognitive capability; resource 
structuring corresponds to structuring capability; resources integration and innovation reflect the 
firm’s integrative capability; and capabilities application corresponds to leveraging capability. 
Some exogenous and endogenous factors act on the dynamic capabilities, leading to an 
interaction of DCM, which further contributes to business failure. The findings are both 
theoretically and empirically significant because the identification of micro-level mechanisms 
extends to a new understanding in current knowledge of business failure by offering a process-
based explanation, which is lacking in the business failure literature. Furthermore, it highlights 
the need to examine the causality between the interactive processes and business failure. 
Another unexpected finding revealed that business failure in the Chinese market came from 
motives of the business transition. The paper therefore identified some industrial changes, such 
as: higher labour costs; an ageing society; overcapacity within industries; internet development; 
and an anti-corruption campaign that could all be viewed as motives for business upgrade or 
transition in the Chinese market. Theoretically, this provides a new research stream on causes of 
business failure.  
This study also showed that most of the firms failed due to an interaction of malfunction of 
structuring capability and malfunction of integrative capability, or an interaction of malfunction 
of cognitive capability and malfunction of structuring capability.  Although attention has been 
paid to dynamic capabilities by many scholars in strategic management, the effects regarding 
DCM in business failure are still in the early stages of development. The model (see Figure 3) 
could provide a theoretical or empirical research guideline on business failure.  
This study provides three implications for practitioners in highly uncertain economies. First, our 
research offers a means of conceptualising their DCs management emphasising an interaction of 
internal and external factors. This helps to delineate the processes and steps inherent in decline 
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and business failure. What’s more, the paper suggests that decision makers should pay more 
attention to DCs management in a highly uncertain environment. Specifically, entrepreneurs and 
top managers need to strengthen their cognitive capability through improving their sensitivity 
and analysis to market changes. Second, entrepreneurs and managers can improve their 
structuring capability by effectively controlling resources loss under highly uncertain market. 
Furthermore, how to improve firm’s integrative capability is a big test for entrepreneurs and 
managers. The findings suggest knowledge and experiences deficits, homogenous team, and 
closed culture in top management may not be beneficial to resources integration and innovation. 
Lastly, entrepreneurs or managers need to improve their leveraging capability which helps their 
products and services diffuse customer value in market. 
Third, this study has suggestions for policy makers on how to help firms improve their DCs 
management to reduce their risks of failure during highly uncertain market. Specifically, 
reducing information asymmetry enables firms to better understand changes of economic 
policies and regulations. Market-oriented reform in capital market and SOEs is necessary to 
provide capital and labour support with private economies, especially for SMEs during business 
upgrade or transition. In addition, building effective supervision mechanism and property right 
protection can improve and support business innovation.                          
Regarding the limitations in this research, although this study emphasises the differences of 
business failure between developed economies and emerging economies, this study only focused 
on an exploration of tangible institutional factors such as regulations, rules, and laws. For the 
intangible institutional factors such as culture, norms, and social ideology seem to be ignored. 
For example, national culture could be regarded as a factor to contribute to business failure 
during transition/upgrade. While the thesis in its current form examined the effects of business 
culture to business failure, the effects of social ideology and national culture also need to be 
considered and examined especially for the countries with a long history. The national culture 
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could be formed in several social norms that affect individual decisions, strategies, and 
behaviours before and after business failure.    
The samples in this study include firms from a wide array of industries including manufacturing, 
retail, technology and culture. Therefore, the determinants and processes of business failure may 
vary in terms of industry. This may produce a bias in understanding business failure in a 
particular sector.  It needs to note that this study examines business failure based on a more 
general context. Specifically, all failed firms are involved in high velocity industries, where 
changes are constant and significant. However, as mentioned above, some specific factors that 
contribute to business failure may vary across different industries. 
Current findings are based on only small and medium-sized enterprises and the process of failure 
may be different with large enterprises. This paper suggests future research on the process of 
business failure can be investigated in large failed enterprises. In addition to this, an exploration 
of common determinants to DCM and business failure needs to be verified based on a large 
sample. Thus, future research could focus on examining the specific correlation between internal 
factors/external factors and malfunction of DCs in a specific sector. Furthermore, future research 
could work for an exploration about how intangible institutional factors interact with other 
internal factors contributing to business failure.    
In conclusion, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly examines how 
the interactions of firm-level and external factors unfold to shape the processes leading to 
business failure. The findings contribute to a better understanding of determinants, processes and 
consequences of business failure. This paper should stimulate future research effort to explore 
this emerging research topic. 
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Table 1. Description of Informants  
 
Table 1.1 Description of informants by sector: Manufacture and Technology  
Pseudonym/position Business 
founded/failed  
Type of industry  Location  Experience of failure   
F002/Owner Founded: 1997 
Closure: 2006 
Manufacture and 
Technology   
Beijing City The senior managers 
only experienced one 
time failure so far. 
F004/ Owner Founded: 1999 
Closure: 2009 
Manufacture  and 
Construction  
Beijing City The senior managers 
only experienced one 
time failure so far. 
F005/ Owner Founded: 1997 
Closure: 2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology  
Beijing City The senior managers 
only experienced one 
time failure so far. 
F006/ Owner Founded: 2003 
Closure: 2009 
Manufacture and 
Technology  
Beijing City The senior managers 
only experienced one 
time failure so far. 
F011/ Co-owner Founded: 2009 
Closure: 2012 
Manufacture and 
Technology  
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F014/ Co-owner 
F014a/Top manager 
Founded: 2003 Closure: 
2006 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Tianjin City The owner and senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F016/Owner  Founded: 2010 Closure: 
2012 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F017/Partner Founded: 2006 Closure: 
2011 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F018/Owner Founded: 2004 Closure: 
2013 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F022/ Owner Founded: 2012 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F023/ Owner Founded: 2011 
Closure: 2014 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F024/ Owner Founded: 1997  Manufacture and Shenzhen The owner and  senior 
managers only 
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F024a/Top manager 
F024b/Top manager 
Closure: 2015 Technology City experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F025/ Owner 
F025a/Top manager  
Founded: 2004 
 Closure: 2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F027/ Co-owner 
F027a/Co-owner  
Founded: 2008  
Closure: 2010 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Shanghai City The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F028/CEO Founded: 2007  
Closure: 2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F029/ Owner Founded: 2014  
Closure: 2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F030/ Owner Founded: 2005 Closure: 
2012 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Hangzhou 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F032/ Owner Founded: 2012 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Hangzhou 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F035/ Owner Founded: 2008 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Shanghai City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F040/ Owner 
F040a/ Top manager  
Founded: 2012 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology  
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F041/ Co-owner 
F041a/Top manager 
Founded: 2012 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F042/ Owner Founded: 2005 Closure: 
2014 
Manufacture and 
Technology    
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F045/ Co-owner Founded: 2005 Closure: 
2010 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F047/ Owner Founded: 2000 Closure: 
2008 
Manufacture and 
Technology 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
 
Table 1.2 Description of informants by sector: Manufacture and Retailing  
Pseudonym/position Business founded/failed  Type of industry  Location  Experience of failure   
F001/Co-Owner Founded: 1997 Manufacture and Beijing City The owner and  senior 
managers only 
 44 
 
F001a/Top manager Closure: 2006 Retailing experienced one time 
failure so far.  
 
F031/ Owner Founded: 2000 
Closure: 2006 
Manufacture and 
Retailing 
Shanghai 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F036/ Owner Founded: 2010 
Closure: 2015 
Manufacture and 
Retailing  
Hangzhou 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F037/ Owner Founded: 2008 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Retailing  
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F039/ Owner Founded: 2010 Closure: 
2015 
Manufacture and 
Retailing 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F043/ Owner Founded: 2006 Closure: 
2010 
Manufacture and 
Retailing  
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F044/ Owner 
F044a/Top manager 
Founded: 2008 Closure: 
2014 
Manufacture and 
Retailing 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F046/ Owner Founded: 1991 Closure: 
2007 
Manufacture and 
Retailing 
Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F049/ Owner Founded: 2000 Closure: 
2014 
Manufacture and 
Retailing 
Huzhou City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
 
Table 1.3 Description of informants by sector: International trade  
Pseudonym/position Business founded/failed  Type of industry  Location  Experience of 
failure   
F003/ Owner Founded: 1997 
Closure: 2014 
International trade 
(Major) and Real 
estate (Minor) 
Beijing City The senior 
managers only 
experienced one 
time failure so far. 
F015/Owner 
F015a/Top manager 
Founded: 2005  
Closure: 2013 
International trade Shenzhen 
City 
The owner and 
senior managers 
only experienced 
one time failure so 
far. 
F034/ Owner Founded: 1999  
Closure: 2015 
International trade 
and Manufacture 
Shanghai City The owner only 
experienced one 
time failure so far 
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Table 1.4 Description of informants by sector: Cultural industry 
Pseudonym/position Business founded/failed  Type of industry  Location  Experience of failure   
F007/ Owner 
F007a/Co-owner  
Founded: 2004 
Closure: 2009 
Cultural industry Beijing City The owner and senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F008/Co-owner  
F008a/Top manager 
Founded: 2013 
Closure: 2015 
Cultural industry Shanghai 
City 
The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F010/ Co-owner Founded: 1999  
Closure: 2006 
Cultural industry Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F013/ Owner Founded: 2005  
Closure: 2015 
Cultural industry  Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F019/ Co-owner 
F019a/Co-owner 
Founded: 1998  
Closure: 2015 
Cultural industry Beijing City The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F020/Owner Founded: 1992  
Closure: 2015 
Cultural industry Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F038/ Owner Founded: 2008  
Closure: 2013 
Cultural industry Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F048/ Owner Founded: 2000  
Closure: 2015 
Cultural industry Fuzhou  
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
F050/ Owner Founded: 2014  
Closure: 2015 
Cultural industry Shenzhen 
City 
The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
 
Table 1.5 Description of informants by sector: Retailing 
Pseudonym/position Business 
founded/failed  
Type of 
industry  
Location  Experience of failure   
F009/ Owner 
F009a/Co-owner  
Founded: 2009  
Closure: 2015 
Retailing  Beijing City The owner and  senior 
managers only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F026/ Co-owner Founded: 2002  
Closure: 2007 
Retailing    Hangzhou City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F033/ Owner Founded: 2005  
Closure: 2015 
Retailing  Shanghai City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far 
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Table 1.6 Description of informants by sector: Advertising media 
Pseudonym/position Business 
founded/failed  
Type of 
industry  
Location  Experience of failure   
F012/ Owner Founded: 2009  
Closure: 2015 
Advertising 
media  
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
F021/ Owner Founded: 2010  
Closure: 2015 
Advertising 
media  
Beijing City The owner only 
experienced one time 
failure so far. 
 
Table 1.7 Description of informants by sector: Government  
M001/ Senior statistician in National Statistical 
Bureau 
------- ------- Beijing City ------- 
M002/ Senior  manager in policy bank ------- ------- Beijing City ------- 
M003/ manager in rural commercial bank ------- ------- Beijing City ------- 
M004/Officer in in the department of SMEs in 
Economic Information Committee 
M004a/Credit manager 
------- ------- Hangzhou City  ------ 
M005/Officer in the department of SMEs in 
Economic Information Committee 
------- ------- Fuzhou City ------- 
 
M006/senior manager in one commercial bank  ------- ------- Beijing City ------- 
M007/Senior manager in law office ------- ------- Shenzhen City ------- 
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Table 2. Internal Analysis  
Environment  Representative quotations 
Lack  of clear 
strategy 
• “We did not make a clear long-term strategy for business development… a 
clear and promising strategy should have been developed by top 
management.” (F045, One failed entrepreneur from Shenzhen)    
• “A long-term strategy was lacking and therefore some managers finally left 
the company.” (F027,  failed entrepreneur in Shanghai)    
• “For us, we could not see a bright future for him. That’s why some key 
managers left the company in 2005 and 2006. This finally led to a loss of 
clients and affected our R&D capability.” (one failed manager, F026)     
Closed culture 
and 
centralization 
• “Our leader was highly centralised in decision making and very cold to 
treat us.” (F019) 
• “He rejected to our suggestion and did a big gamble on another investment 
project. He just made a dream I thought. Consequently, core members 
including me left the company. After three or four months, the company 
had to close since the failed gamble.”  (F014)    
• “Our boss always pretends to be open and democratic. In fact, he is highly 
centralization in decision making. This made some top managers feel 
disappointment and even offensive…during business upgrade, he never 
listened to our suggestion so that we wasted a lot resources…” (F014a)     
Individual 
idealization 
and fantasy       
• “We once tried to invest some high-risk projects rather than made a 
transition … However, we never considered whether we could be able to 
take the risk of the projects … it looks like a big gamble … we just had a 
fantasy if we could win a bet … finally, we failed on this project and lots 
of resources were wasted.” (F030) 
• “I think our boss is overly idealism…he always overvalued some projects 
as well as some people in our team… maybe it is part of his 
characteristics…this made some good talents lose trust for him and left the 
company…” (F041a)   
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Figure 1. A Framework of Process of DCM on Business Failure  
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Figure 2. A Process of DCM and Business Failure  
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Figure 3. A Unified Processes of DCM  
 
 
